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Returning Individual Research Results: 
What Role Should People’s Preferences 
Play? 
Lisa S. Parker, PhD* 
INTRODUCTION: FACTS AND VALUES, PREFERENCES 
AND POLICY 
Asking what role people’s preferences should play in poli-
cies regarding the return of biobank research results is a specif-
ic case of asking what role facts should play in prescriptions 
governing action. Since Scottish Enlightenment philosopher 
David Hume articulated the point, it has been generally recog-
nized that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.”1 Neverthe-
less, it is also generally and correctly assumed that facts mat-
ter for prescriptions. They occasion or motivate the 
development of policy as, for example, the revelation of Nazi 
atrocities committed in the name of research-motivated the de-
velopment of the Nuremburg Code. They also constrain policies 
as prescriptive guides to action are constrained by what is ac-
tually, factually possible—“ought” implies or assumes “can,” as 
philosophers say.2 And, they inform policy as when facts about 
burdens of various research protocols, for example, are used to 
develop criteria for assessing an appropriate balance of burdens 
and potential benefits. Finally, a primary point of ethical, legal, 
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 1. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton 
& Mary J. Norton eds., 2007). 
 2. Robert Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?, 
16 UTILITAS 42, 42 (2004). 
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and regulatory prescriptions is to protect and promote the in-
terests of people and to fulfill their needs. Facts about those in-
terests and needs are therefore fundamentally relevant to poli-
cy development. Moreover, if in fact no one actually embraced a 
particular prescriptive policy, there would be no will to follow 
or enforce it. 
To determine what role people’s preferences should play in 
policies regarding the return of biobank research results will 
involve examining how people’s preferences regarding research 
results motivate development of a policy regarding their return; 
what is and can be known about people’s relevant preferences; 
and the relationship between people’s preferences and inter-
ests, including those served by research and the policies gov-
erning it. Put succinctly, I will examine what we mean when 
we talk about taking people’s preferences seriously, as when an 
article about communicating results states: “Participants’ de-
sires do not necessarily determine policy, but respect for partic-
ipants requires taking their preferences seriously.”3 In the first 
section, I discuss some generally agreed upon assumptions in 
the debate about returning results. In the second, I present an 
overview of the empirical research conducted to assess people’s 
preferences about returning results. The third section focuses 
on people’s preferences—what they are and whether they can 
be used to inform research policy. Here I also raise some prob-
lems with relying on people’s preferences, but suggest the ways 
in which they must be taken seriously and a context in which 
they are decisive. In light of this analysis, in the final section, I 
examine some of the normative arguments employed to support 
return of individualized results of biorepository research. 
I. UNCONTROVERSIAL ASSUMPTIONS 
This inquiry begins by discussing some largely uncontro-
versial assumptions. First, the responsibility of investigators to 
publicize aggregate results of their research is well established. 
Investigators ought to publish their results in the professional 
literature so that other scientists may seek to replicate and 
build upon their findings. Moreover, they ought to make their 
findings available and intelligible to the public, and especially 
                                                          
 3. David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller, Communicating the Results 
of Clinical Research to Participants: Attitudes, Practices, and Future Direc-
tions, 5 PLOS MED. 714, 717 (2008). 
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to the population that participated in or contributed to the re-
search. Doing so contributes to general scientific literacy, in-
creases awareness of the benefits and limits of scientific re-
search, and recognizes the contribution made by subjects. This 
inquiry, therefore, focuses on the more controversial issue of 
disclosure of nonaggregate, individual results of research 
(IRRs). 
Moreover, when speaking of the “disclosure” of IRRs, what 
is meant is the disclosure of IRRs to the individual him/herself, 
or alternatively to his/her physician or designee. Other disclo-
sure of such personal information—on the nightly news, to a 
body concerned with presidential nominees’ health, or to life in-
surance underwriters or other third parties—is obviously not 
contemplated, though the possible access of others to individu-
als’ personal information following initial disclosure to them is 
worth consideration. 
Second, in asking about the role of people’s preferences in 
return of IRRs, it is really the offer to return individual results 
that is under consideration, although for ease and concision, 
the shorthand “return of” is sometimes substituted. It is agreed 
that in almost no case would it be appropriate to supply or im-
pose information without first determining that an individual 
wants to receive it.4 When an offer of a particular result is ac-
tually made, the individual’s expressed preference (i.e., choice 
or decision) to receive it (or not) is generally decisive for rea-
sons discussed at the end of Section three. 
Third, the question here is what role people’s preferences 
should play in policy development, specifically in policies re-
garding whether and how to offer return of IRRs. Because the 
nature of both the results and the research is relevant for such 
policy development, the inquiry here is restricted to the focus of 
this volume: genomic research using biobanked materials and 
associated data. Furthermore, the focus is on policies governing 
individual research results, not incidental findings, although 
admittedly the line between these is blurry in the case of ge-
nomic biobank research which is not hypothesis driven.5 The 
                                                          
 4. One group of commentators states genetic information should never be 
given to a research participant who does not want it. See Laura M. Beskow et 
al., Informed Consent for Population-Based Research Involving Genetics, 286 
JAMA 2315, 2320 (2001). 
 5. Where there are no specific aims, it is perhaps impossible to distin-
guish incidental findings (that are beyond the aims of the study) from individ-
ual research results. In such large-scale discovery research, perhaps the only 
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distinction is raised here primarily to acknowledge that for 
some types of biobank research, policies may differ with regard 
to offering individual research results versus incidental find-
ings. Nevertheless, many of the considerations raised herein 
are relevant to considering policies governing return of IRRs 
from research with different designs, or where the finding is ac-
tually an incidental finding (i.e., a finding not responsive to the 
study’s aims). 
Fourth, to be a candidate for return, a genomic IRR must 
have analytic and clinical validity, i.e., both the genetic varia-
tion and the associated phenotype must be reliably identified. 
It is generally, though not uniformly, agreed that unreliable re-
sults ought not be offered back to individuals. Establishing clin-
ical validity is more challenging than establishing analytic va-
lidity, because reported associations between genetic variation 
and phenotype are often not consistently replicated.6 Moreover, 
when the mechanism of action or the functional relationship 
between genotype and phenotype remain largely unknown, that 
understanding cannot serve to bolster the clinical validity of a 
genomic finding. Thus determination of the reliability, and con-
sequently the potential reportability, of a genomic IRR partly 
depends on the state of scientific understanding in particular 
domains (e.g., cancer versus psychiatric genetics), as well as 
the stability of the result through replication attempts. Some 
IRRs from research involving biorepositories, however, may be 
well-characterized polymorphisms. 
Finally, the offer must comply with applicable laws. Specif-
ically, the result must have been generated in—or verified in—
a CLIA-certified laboratory, as per the Clinical Laboratory Im-
provements Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), in order to be offered 
back to individuals.7 Although some commentators suggest 
there is uncertainty about how to handle an IRR when no test 
exists to enable replication of the result in a CLIA-certified la-
boratory prior to returning it to an individual,8 the law seems 
                                                          
findings that can be termed truly incidental are those identified upon baseline 
screening or determination of eligibility of biobanked material and data. 
 6. Joel N. Hirschhorn et al., A Comprehensive Review of Genetic Associa-
tion Studies, 4 GENETICS MED. 45, 49–50 (2002). 
 7. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.3 (2011). 
 8. Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Report-
ing Genetic Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION: 
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clear: only laboratories that “do not report patient specific re-
sults for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease 
or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of individual 
patients” are exempt from CLIA requirements.9 
II. RESEARCH ON PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES: FROM 
DIVERSITY COMES APPARENT CONSENSUS 
For the past decade, findings from multiple studies of peo-
ple’s preferences regarding the return of research results have 
been used to motivate, inform, and justify policy recommenda-
tions regarding return of IRRs.10 These studies vary across a 
number of dimensions.11 Without attempting a comprehensive 
review, this section highlights some of the variation in these 
studies, as well as some of their major findings that are cited to 
suggest there is substantial consensus regarding return of 
IRRs. This section provides content and context for the analysis 
of preferences that follows. 
In studies of people’s preferences regarding return of re-
sults, participants were asked about receiving aggregate (or 
summary) results,12 individualized results,13 or both.14 Receiv-
                                                          
CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 576–77 (2010). 
 9. Ellen Wright Clayton, Sharing Individual Research Results with 
Biospecimen Contributors: Counterpoint, 21 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, 
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 260, 261 (2012) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(3) 
(2011)). 
 10. See Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 714 (presenting a narrative 
review of twenty-eight empirical studies and discussing the many dimensions 
of these studies). 
 11. Id. 
 12. E.g., Ann H. Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating in Clinical 
Trials Want to Know Study Results?, 95 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 491, 491 (2003) 
[hereinafter Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating]; Ann H. Partridge et 
al., Offering Participants Results of a Clinical Trial: Sharing Results of a Neg-
ative Study, 365 LANCET 963, 963–64 (2005) [hereinafter Partridge et al., Of-
fering Participants Results]; Charlene J. Schulz et al., Impact on Survivors of 
Retinoblastoma When Informed of Study Results on Risk of Second Cancers, 41 
MED. & PEDIATRIC ONCOLOGY 36, 38 (2003). 
 13. E.g., Juli Bollinger, Joan Scott & David Kaufman, Public Preferences 
Regarding the Return of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a 
Qualitative Focus Group Study, 14 GENETICS MED. (forthcoming 2012) (e-pub 
at 1); Kurt D. Christensen et al., Disclosing Individual CDKN2A Research Re-
sults to Melanoma Survivors: Interest, Impact, and Demands on Researchers, 
20 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION, 522, 522–23 (2011); 
Paul R. Helft & Christopher K. Daugherty, Are We Taking Without Giving in 
Return? The Ethics of Research-Related Biopsies and the Benefits of Clinical 
Trial Participation, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4793, 4793–94 (2006); David 
Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions About a Large 
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ing aggregate results may have been conceived as involving re-
ceipt of a letter or newsletter,15 having access to a study web-
site,16 or reporting results in public media. 
The issue of receiving individualized results may have been 
conceptualized as being invited to request such results,17 and/or 
being offered individualized findings, including those of un-
known significance,18 or only findings of apparent significance 
(usually clinical or health-related significance).19 The offer and 
subsequent disclosure of IRRs could be envisioned as occurring 
in person;20 by letter, email, or phone;21 by the individual ac-
cessing a study website;22 or by some combination of these 
methods (e.g., email notification that one may access an IRR 
available on a secure website); or the policy could be that IRRs 
                                                          
Genetic Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 835 (2008); Fiona Alice Miller, 
Robin Zoe Hayeems & Jessica Peace Bytautas, What Is a Meaningful Result? 
Disclosing the Results of Genomic Research in Autism to Research Partici-
pants, 18 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 867, 867–68 (2010); Juli Murphy et al., Pub-
lic Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort Genetic Research, AM. 
J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 36, 38; M.P.M. Richards et al., Issues of Consent 
and Feedback in a Genetic Epidemiological Study of Women with Breast Can-
cer, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 93, 93 (2003); Dave Wendler & Ezekiel Emanuel, The 
Debate over Research on Stored Biological Samples: What Do Sources Think?, 
162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1457, 1457 (2002). 
 14. E.g., Laura M. Beskow & Sondra J. Smolek, Prospective Biorepository 
Participants’ Perspectives on Access to Research Results, 4 J. EMPIRICAL RES. 
ON HUM. RES. ETHICS, Sept. 2009, at 99, 100; Jasper Bovenberg et al., Always 
Expect the Unexpected: Legal and Social Aspects of Reporting Biobank Re-
search Results to Individual Research Participants, CENTRE FOR SOC’Y & 
GENOMICS, Nov. 2009, at 1, 8–11. 
 15. See, e.g., Partridge et al., Offering Participants Results, supra note 12, 
at 963; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 36–38. 
 16. E.g., Richards et al., supra note 13, at 96. 
 17. Id. at 93–94; Ellen J. Steinbart et al., Impact of DNA Testing for Ear-
ly-Onset Familial Alzheimer Disease and Frontotemporal Dementia, 58 
ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1828, 1828 (2001). 
 18. Miller, Hayeems, & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 868–69; Murphy et al., 
supra note 13, at 39; Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1457–59. 
 19. Kaufman et al., supra note 13, at 837–38; Richards et al., supra note 
13, at 94. 
 20. Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93; Steinbart et al., supra note 17, at 
1829. 
 21. Christensen et al., supra, note 13, at 523; Partridge et al., Offering 
Participants Results, supra note 12, at 963. 
 22. Though not reporting an empirical study, this model is proposed under 
the Informed Cohort research regime. Isaac S. Kohane et al., Reestablishing 
the Researcher-Patient Compact, 316 SCI. 836, 836 (2007). 
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were not to be returned.23 The results in question may have 
been (actually or hypothetically) from a clinical trial or inter-
vention research (perhaps with a placebo control) where either 
aggregate or individualized results could have relevance for 
continued clinical care for the condition under study;24 from a 
disease-specific epidemiological study;25 from disease-specific 
genomic research;26 from either hypothesis-driven or discovery 
research on materials from a disease-specific or population-
based biorepository.27 
The people whose preferences were sought may have been 
enrolled in a clinical trial or other clinical research,28 disease-
affected (or parents of disease-affected children),29 at increased 
risk for a condition,30 part of a non-disease specific patient pop-
ulation,31 representative of “the public,”32 or some combination 
of these populations. They may have been asked to make an ac-
tual choice about receiving results (aggregate or individual-
                                                          
 23. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 101–04. 
 24. Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491; Par-
tridge et al., Offering Participants Results, supra note 12, at 963–64. 
 25. Christensen et al., supra, note 13, at 522; Richards et al., supra note 
13, at 93; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 36. 
 26. Miller, Hayeems, & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867–68; Steinbart et 
al., supra note 17, at 1828. 
 27. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99; Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman, 
supra note 13, at 1−2; Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 8; Kaufman et al, su-
pra note 13, at 831; Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 36–37; Wendler & Eman-
uel, supra note 13, at 1458. As Knoppers and Laberge note, there are im-
portant differences with regard to participants, their expectations, and the 
nature of findings between hypothesis-driven and discovery research, and 
across studies involving general or disease-specific biorepositories, or large-
cohort studies. Bartha Maria Knoppers & Claude Laberge, Return of “Accu-
rate” and “Actionable” Results: Yes!, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June–July 2009, at 
107, 108. 
 28. Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491; Par-
tridge et al., Offering Patients Results, supra note 12, at 963; Wendler & 
Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1457. 
 29. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 523; Helft & Daugherty, supra 
note 13, at 4793; Miller, Hayeems & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867; Richards 
et al., supra note 13, at 93; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 37. 
 30. Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 37; Steinbart et al., supra note17, at 
1828.  
 31. Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 9 (also surveyed biobank research-
ers regarding their preferences to communicate results or not); Wendler & 
Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1457. 
 32. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 100; Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman, 
supra note 13, at 1−2; Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 9; Kaufman et al., 
supra note 13, at 831; Murphy et al, supra note 13, at 38.  
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ized),33 presented with a hypothetical vignette(s) or scenar-
io(s),34 or asked direct questions designed to elicit their prefer-
ences (e.g., about return of different types of results and/or 
method of doing so).35 The study may have involved a survey,36 
interviews,37 focus groups,38 mixed methods research, or—
relatively rarely—may have reported actual choices regarding 
offer of return and degrees of satisfaction with the choice.39 
What appears rather consistent across most of these stud-
ies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express 
a desire for receiving research results. In a summary of ten 
studies reporting participants’ preferences regarding receipt of 
aggregate results, “a median of 90% (range 20–100%) wished to 
receive study results.”40 The same summary reported that 67–
100% of participants from 9 studies would want to receive 
IRRs.41 The number of participants in these studies, employing 
a range of qualitative and quantitative methods, ranged from 
13 to 8491.42 For example, in a genetic epidemiological study of 
women with breast cancer, 93% of 1484 participants indicated 
that they “would like to be informed if [the investigators] find 
something” that “may indicate that members of [their] family 
might have an increased risk of developing breast cancer.”43 
                                                          
 33. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 523; Partridge et al., Offering Pa-
tients Results, supra note 12, at 963; Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93; 
Steinbart et al., supra note 17, at 1828. 
 34. Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 24−25; Helft & Daugherty, supra 
note 13, at 4793; Murphy et al, supra note 13, at 38−39; Wendler & Emanuel, 
supra note 13, at 1458. 
 35. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 100; Kaufman et al, supra note 
13, at 832; Miller, Hayeems & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 868; Partridge et 
al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491.  
 36. Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 24-25; Helft & Daugherty, supra 
note 13, at 4793; Kaufman et al, supra note 13, at 832; Partridge et al., Do Pa-
tients Participating, supra note 12, at 491; Partridge et al., Offering Patients 
Results, supra note 12, at 963; Schulz et al., supra note12, at 37; Steinbart et 
al., supra note 17, at 1829; Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1458. 
 37. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 100; Miller, Hayeems & 
Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867; Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93. 
 38. Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 2; Miller, Hayeems & 
Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867; Murphy et al, supra note 13, at 38.  
 39. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 523; Richards et al., supra note 
13, at 93; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 38. 
 40. Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 714. 
 41. Id. at 715. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93. 
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 Beyond this summary, in a pilot study of offering IRRs to 
participants in a genetic epidemiology study of melanoma sur-
vivors, nineteen of twenty-seven (seventy percent) participants 
who were recontacted and offered their individual CDKN2A 
gene test result chose to receive it.44 In contrast, only 21 of 251 
(8.4%) of those at 50% risk for early-onset frontotemporal de-
mentia requested individual testing (with return of results and 
counseling) following receipt of results reporting genetic find-
ings in the family.45 This difference in level of interest suggests 
a common theme: especially among those at increased risk for a 
specific condition, genomic results are most welcome when the 
condition is treatable or preventable. 
Reporting on forty prospective contributors to a 
biorepository, another study found that “over 75% of interview-
ees thought researchers should provide access to at least some 
kinds of individual results. At the same time, almost 75% said 
they would not expect to get individual results, based on their 
understanding of the consent form. . . .”46 Investigators in Am-
sterdam conducted a questionnaire study, using nine fictitious 
genetic risk results, to assess preferences for IRR return among 
two populations: patients who had consented to research in-
volving banking of tissue and citizens.47 For all nine fictitious 
IRRs, which varied as to associated condition and type of in-
formation (e.g., disease risk or pharmacogenomic), seventy to 
seventy-eight percent of citizens and patients would prefer to 
receive the results.48 Citizens preferred receipt slightly more 
than patients.49 
Though this is not a comprehensive analysis, it provides 
evidence that when people are asked about their preference, a 
substantial proportion express a desire or preference for receiv-
ing IRRs. As investigators in the Amsterdam study point out, 
however, a “sizeable minority” do not.50 A focus group study 
found, in fact, a “small group remained adamantly opposed to 
the return of any IRRs, citing that returning IRRs was not the 
intent of the study and that the cost to do so could negatively 
                                                          
 44. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 524. 
 45. Steinbart et al., supra note 17, at 1828. 
 46. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 108. 
 47. Bovenberg et al, supra note 14, at 231. 
 48. Id. at 232. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 232. 
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affect the research.”51 
Nevertheless, it is this apparent consensus of empirical 
findings that has fueled an “emerging consensus” that at least 
some IRRs should be returned.52 That people’s preferences war-
rant return of individual results of biorepository research 
(IRBRs) is a conclusion proffered as part of this empirically-
driven normative trend. If it is so clear that at least the majori-
ty of people want to be offered IRRs, then why should there be 
any question about recommending and devising policies to do 
so? The problem is that there are problems with preferences. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH EMPLOYING PEOPLE’S 
PREFERENCES IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
Given that so many people apparently want to receive 
IRRs, why shouldn’t that fact be decisive, or at least a primary 
factor, in developing a research policy? In an enterprise where 
the goal is preference satisfaction, people’s individual prefer-
ences should play a huge role. In ethics, if our view of the Good 
were preference satisfaction—not, for example, a hedonistic 
view or a substantive view of the Good—then people’s prefer-
ences would be supremely important. Their satisfaction would 
be valuable, indeed the value. On such a view, satisfying peo-
ple’s preferences would be the right thing to do because prefer-
ence satisfaction is good, indeed the Good. 
But the goal of research is not preference satisfaction; in-
deed that is not even the goal of public health or clinical care, 
which are sometimes blurred with or taken to be the overarch-
ing enterprises of which health research is a part.53 Instead, 
                                                          
 51. Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 6. 
 52. Anneline L. Bredenoord et al., Disclosure of Individual Genetic Data to 
Research Participants: The Debate Reconsidered, 27 TRENDS GENETICS 41, 45 
(2011); Michelle N. Meyer, The Kindness of Strangers: The Donative Contract 
Between Subjects and Researchers and the Non-Obligation to Return Individu-
al Results of Genetic Research, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 44, 44. It 
might also be added that if the research context, type of results, and charac-
teristics of study population matter for reliable assessment of people’s prefer-
ences, relatively few studies have replicated preference results while employ-
ing the same set of study variables. 
 53. Christian Munthe, The Goals of Public Health: An Integrated Multi-
dimensional Model, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 39, 40 (2008) (listing the goals of 
public health as the promotion of population health, addressing concerns with 
the distribution of health within a society, and promoting individual and au-
tonomous health opportunities); Ann Nevin, Visiting Professor, Fla. Int’l Univ. 
& Professor Emerita, Ariz. State Univ., Keynote Address for Barry Univ. 2006 
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the increase of generalizable knowledge is the goal of research, 
though its activities are constrained and informed by the possi-
bility of that knowledge having social value, which must itself 
be informed by some account of what is good/the Good.54 The 
goal of public health and clinical medicine is health, which it-
self contributes to people’s well-being.55 Few people would em-
brace a preference satisfaction view of well-being, though argu-
ing against it is well beyond the scope of this inquiry. It may be 
enough to recall an occasion when one’s preference was based 
on mistaken beliefs and its satisfaction did not, therefore, make 
one better off. 
Even if preference satisfaction is not the goal, however, 
there may be reasons to take people’s preferences into account 
in developing policies regarding IRBRs.56 Yet, there are also 
reasons militating against basing such policies on prefer-
ences.57 To understand why people’s preferences may not be the 
best motivation for development of policies to return IRBRs, or 
the best informational source for doing so, one must first exam-
ine what preferences are and their relationship to people’s be-
liefs, decisions, behaviors, and interests in general.58 Then one 
can specifically examine people’s IRR-related preferences, be-
liefs, and behaviors to determine the proper role of preferences 
in policies regarding IRBRs. 
A. WHAT PREFERENCES ARE 
“Preference” can have at least three different meanings in 
                                                          
Research Conference: Why Do “We” “Do Research?”(Jan. 21, 2006) , available 
at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED492638.pdf (noting that to meet the needs 
of children, teachers, and classrooms; to fulfill personal needs because of other 
people; and to add to the knowledge base are common responses to “why do 
you do research?”). 
 54. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David Wendler & Christine Grady, What 
Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 2701, 2701 (2000). 
 55. See id. at 2703. 
 56. See, e.g., Daniel M. Hausman, Valuing Health, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
246, 257−59 (2006) (surveying arguments for and against relying on prefer-
ences to compare and value health states, and recognizing that reliance on 
preferences may be advocated “by arguing . . . that the variety of circumstanc-
es, aims, and values makes it impossible to construct a general theory of good-
ness of health states and . . . that it is offensive to disregard the evaluations of 
individuals, even though they may sometimes be badly off the mark.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. For the account that follows, I am indebted to the work of Daniel 
Hausman, as well as to conversation with Marcus Adams, though I assume 
responsibility for any misunderstandings or errors in reasoning. 
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ordinary usage.59 One can use “prefer” to refer to choice per se, 
as when one responds to the person scooping gelato, saying “I 
prefer the chocolate.”60 Perhaps this usage contributes to the 
belief that people’s preferences can be “read off of” their choices. 
Yet, in a common way of understanding choices and prefer-
ences, that one chose chocolate may not reveal one’s flavor 
preference. One may have preferred the dulce de leche, but 
chocolate was on sale and having left one’s wallet at home, one 
can only scrape together coins to meet the sale price. In this 
case, one’s preference for dulce de leche employs the second 
meaning of preference: liking.61 Preference is not mere liking, 
however, but comparative liking. 
In its third usage, preference reflects a comparative evalu-
ation or judgment of which is the better choice, as when even 
though I prefer (i.e., more greatly like the taste of) dulce de 
leche, I judge the chocolate to be better to purchase and eat.62 
In my overall comparative evaluation, I may consider that I 
like both to some degree, though I like dulce de leche better; 
that I believe chocolate to have some health benefits lacking in 
dulce de leche; and that the chocolate in question is a Fair 
Trade product. The latter two considerations outweigh my 
greater liking of dulce de leche, leading to my preference for the 
chocolate. Still, if I have given up chocolate for Lent, this factor 
may compete with my preferences to influence my choice. Alt-
hough this factor could be explained as influencing my choice 
by influencing my preferences—“she prefers to fulfill the obli-
gations of her religion, rather than to eat chocolate”—this fac-
tor seems more naturally described as a constraint on my pref-
erences or as competing with them. 
It is this third meaning of preference as comparative eval-
uation that seems most relevant to considering research re-
sults. Such preferences are not mere “gut feeling” likings or de-
sires, but are more cognitively complex in two ways. First, they 
are comparative.63 Second, they are influenced by beliefs.64 In 
the previous example, my beliefs about the health benefits and 
                                                          
 59. Daniel M. Hausman, Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Scienc-
es, 41 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 3, 7 (2011). 
 60. Cf. id. at 5 (preferring tuna to salmon). 
 61. See id. at 5−6. 
 62. Cf. id. at 6 (comparing sorbet and cheesecake for dessert). 
 63. See Hausman, supra note 56, at 254. 
 64. See id. at 260. 
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the Fair Trade status of the chocolate influenced my preference 
for it. Preferences are comparative judgments that rank states 
of affairs about which people have preferences conditioned on 
beliefs. A person’s preference that investigators inform her of 
clinically significant IRBRs might be conditioned on her belief 
that learning clinically significant genomic information will 
prompt her to engage in preventive health behaviors or to in-
form her offspring of increased health risks. 
B. EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS LURKING BEHIND PREFERENCES 
As comparative evaluations, preferences are plagued by 
particular epistemic problems. They may be based, in part, on 
false beliefs.65 In the gelato example,66 it may be the case that 
unbeknownst to me, the particular chocolate supplier has actu-
ally lost its Fair Trade certification for violating child labor 
standards, or the particular chocolate has been Dutch pro-
cessed, which allegedly reduces its health benefits. Had I been 
better informed, I would have had different beliefs and, conse-
quently, a different preference between the two gelato op-
tions.67 
Several of the studies of people’s preferences regarding re-
turn of IRRs—indeed, some studies reporting that a high pro-
portion prefer receiving them68—also reported that people held 
various false beliefs.69 Though people’s beliefs relevant to re-
turn of IRRs have not been studied as extensively as their pref-
erences, there is evidence that people do in fact frequently have 
several false beliefs.70 Of prospective biorepository contributors 
                                                          
 65. Hausman, supra note 59, at 17–18. 
 66. See supra Part 3.A. 
 67. See also Hausman, supra note 59, at 18 (noting that there is never an 
exact one-to-one correlation between choices and preferences because of the 
different reasoning behind those choices). 
 68. E.g., Kaufman et al., supra note 13, at 836–38 (“Public eagerness for 
genetic information is unsurprising in an environment where genetic research 
is widely believed to be beneficial . . . .”). 
 69. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99, 102−03; see also Conrad Fer-
nandez, Public Expectations for Return of Results—Time to Stop Being Pater-
nalistic?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 46, 47 (explaining the possible con-
siderations of researchers); David C. Landy et al., How Disease Advocacy 
Organizations Participate in Clinical Research: A Survey of Genetic 
Organizations, 14 GENETICS MED. (forthcoming 2012) (e-pub at 5) (detailing 
the beliefs that underpin the medical philosophy of disease advocacy 
organizations). 
 70. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 102–03 (noting that patients did 
not understand the different obligations for researchers and physicians); see 
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drawn from a general, geographically-defined population, forty 
percent had somewhat mistaken views of differences in 
knowledge between investigators and their personal physi-
cians: 
Some felt that their physician would already have discovered any 
problems with their health, expressing doubt that research results 
would represent information their physician did not already know. 
Others, however, thought researchers might have more or newer 
knowledge than their physician would have, and gave this as a reason 
they should get individual results.71 
The first belief is largely mistaken given the types of re-
search to be undertaken, and the disease susceptibility infor-
mation that may be discovered using biobanked materials. The 
second belief may be false, given the relevance of examining 
family and personal medical history and environmental compo-
nents in order to interpret the significance of many genomic 
findings, even though researchers are more likely than physi-
cians to have a current understanding of particular genetic var-
iations.72 In addition, “many interviewees seemed to assume 
that individual research results would relate to a currently di-
agnosable, yet undetected condition,” saying things such as: 
Give me any kind of information that would help me along. If I had 
cancer, I sure wouldn’t want to go two or three years and they know it 
and I don’t know it. Give it [the results] to me. 
Regardless of what they find out, whatever kind of diseases they find 
out that I have, I would want to know about it.. . . 
. . . [I]f they found out that, God forbid, I might have a tumor or can-
cer building up and I don’t know it and I’m thinking I’m healthy, I 
think they should get in touch with somebody. Like send me a letter: . 
. . [W]e found some cancer on you or . . . you know, you might not be 
living that much longer.73 
This apparent misunderstanding of biorepository research 
as discovering active, present disease conditions in individuals 
                                                          
also Kaufman et al., supra note 13, at 836–38 (noting that potential clinical 
trial participants would like their data even if it was of little or no value, in  
part because of the perceived importance of genetic testing in modern medi-
cine). 
 71. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 103. 
 72. See Brian H. Shirts & Lisa S. Parker, Changing Interpretations, Sta-
ble Genes: Responsibilities of Patients, Professionals, and Policy Makers in the 
Clinical Interpretation of Complex Genetic Information, 10 GENETICS MED. 
778, 778 (2008) (“[C]omplex genetic traits usually involve [the] interaction of 
multiple genes and environmental factors. Understanding genetic risk for 
complex genetic traits has been much more challenging than expected.”). 
 73. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 69, at 104. 
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linked to stored materials—rather than associations between 
genotype and (perhaps present) disease, or between genotype 
and increased risk for disease—perhaps explains why some 
participants believed their physicians would already have dis-
covered any problems with their health that might be revealed 
through biorepository research.74 
In one survey of individuals who had either contributed 
materials to biorepositories or were Medicare recipients, 88.8% 
said they would want to be “informed of results of uncertain 
clinical significance,” prompting study investigators to com-
ment: “Future research should assess whether respondents’ de-
sire for research results of uncertain clinical significance re-
flects a lack of appreciation for the difference between clinically 
validated tests and research assays with no proven reliability 
or validity.”75 The authors advise, however, that “[i]n the mean-
time, researchers should be aware that the common practice of 
not divulging results of uncertain significance may prove upset-
ting to many research participants.”76 Indeed in a paper sum-
marizing findings from eighteen studies regarding participant 
preferences, the results of this study (88.8% desire receipt of 
IRRs of uncertain significance) are considered alongside af-
firmative responses regarding desire for reliable, clinically sig-
nificant results as evidence supporting the growing consensus 
that people prefer to receive IRRs.77 
Another study focused not on individuals’ beliefs about re-
ceiving results, but on the effect of investigators generating in-
dividualized genetic results on individuals’ desires for those re-
sults.78 Here the problem with the preferences might be 
described as their being oddly influenced rather than their be-
ing based on false belief.79 Study participants were either par-
ticipating in a longitudinal study of Alzheimer disease (AD) or 
receiving clinical care for cancer (CA); all contributed biological 
                                                          
 74. See id. at 103 (“Some felt that their physician would already have dis-
covered any problems with their health, expressing doubt that research re-
sults would represent information their physician did not already know.”). 
 75. Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13 at 1461. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 717 (“Available data consistently 
indicate that research participants want aggregate and clinically significant 
individual study results made available to them.”). 
 78. David Wendler & Rebecca Pentz, How Does the Collection of Genetic 
Test Results Affect Research Participants?, 143A AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 
1733, 1733 (2007). 
 79. See id. 
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samples for research purposes.80 The participants were pre-
sented with a range of hypothetical opportunities to have ge-
netic testing to determine their chances of developing Alz-
heimer’s disease.81 The first two opportunities involved testing 
saliva, either through a free home test kit or a test performed 
by a researcher.82 After the first two options, participants were 
asked: “Suppose that as part of a study in which you were in-
volved, a researcher had already done a test on your blood, and 
the researcher knew your chances of developing Alzheimer’s 
disease. How likely is it that you would want to know the re-
sults?”83 
Only thirty-six percent of AD and forty-two percent of CA 
participants reported being very likely to use the home test kit, 
and only forty-six percent of CA participants were very likely to 
ask a researcher to perform the test (the AD participants were 
not asked).84 In contrast, sixty-four percent of AD and seventy-
four percent of CA participants were “very likely” to want to 
know the result if the researcher knew it.85 Combining those 
that answered “very likely” and “somewhat likely” to want to 
know if the researcher knew, the proportions rose to seventy-
eight percent of AD and ninety percent of CA participants.86 
Asked directly “[h]ow would the fact that the researcher knew 
your results already affect your wish to know your results?,” 
40% of the CA cohort responded that it would greatly or some-
what increase their interest.87 Asked as an open-ended ques-
tion, members of the AD cohort indicated that the existence of 
the test result, or the fact that the researcher or another person 
knew their test result, would increase their desire to know the 
result as well.88 These results do not, of course, indicate false 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 1734 (“[P]atients were asked to contribute to research any re-
maining tissue that was not needed for their clinical care.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (explaining that participants were first asked about utilizing a 
home test kit before being asked about taking a test that involved a research-
er). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1734−35. 
 85. Id. at 1735. “Very likely” represented the highest level of enthusiasm 
to receive results. Id. at 1374–75. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. at 1734, 1736. 
 88. Id. at 1736. 
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beliefs.89 They indicate reasons that, at least in the hypothet-
ical context described, people would choose to learn a genomic 
result. These might be considered reasons that compete with 
the individuals’ preferences to influence choice (I would prefer 
not to know, but since you do . . .), or they might be considered 
to influence the preferences directly. However they are thought 
to affect preferences, the fact that someone else knows the in-
formation appears to influence individuals’ hypothetical choices 
regarding acquiring the information themselves.90 Whether or 
not this is a good reason—and whether it is itself grounded in 
accurate or erroneous beliefs—it is not a health-related reason 
for learning the information, or even a reason related to per-
sonal or reproductive planning. 
One health-related false belief did emerge from this study. 
“A small number of research participants indicated that the 
fact the researcher knew their test result would decrease their 
desire to know it: ‘The investigator could keep me informed 
about what might help or affect me.’”91 This false belief is a 
classic case of therapeutic misconception. A similar misconcep-
tion was also evident in a study of beliefs and attitudes of those 
donating samples for genetic research, where a large percent-
age did not distinguish between research and diagnostic test-
ing.92 In yet another study, forty-two percent of clinical re-
search participants agreed that results from a research biopsy 
would “influence their health and care,” while another fifteen 
percent agreed that the biopsy may or may not do so.93 
Clearly it is problematic to ground policy regarding offer of 
IRBRs in people’s preferences if those preferences are often 
based on false beliefs.94 Many of the studies assessing people’s 
preferences have not examined the beliefs on which their pref-
erences are based, so the prevalence of false beliefs is not cur-
rently known. 
The obvious not-so-quick fix for those who believe prefer-
                                                          
 89. Id. at 1737 (“Many respondents attributed this effect to the fact that 
they did not want investigators to possess genetic information about them that 
they did not possess.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1736. 
 92. Marsha Michie et al., “If I Could in a Small Way Help”: Motivations 
for and Beliefs About Sample Donation for Genetic Research, 6 J. EMPIRICAL 
RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS, June 2011, at 57, 67. 
 93. Helft & Daugherty, supra note 13, at 4794. 
 94. See Hausman, supra note 56, at 261. 
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ences should motivate and inform policy development is to 
specify that when evaluating policy options in light of people’s 
preferences, policy makers should attend to “rational or in-
formed preferences,” not those that are merely manifest.95 But, 
“[s]hifting from actual to informed preference limits the signifi-
cance of preference.”96 Relying on informed, or corrected prefer-
ences, shifts attention from people’s actual preferences to the 
options or states of affairs that make their preferences appro-
priate or worth taking into account.97 By introducing a notion 
of appropriate or corrected preferences, a direct normative 
evaluation of the options is smuggled in.98 
Rather than assessing people’s preferences, policy makers 
might better evaluate directly those options or states of affairs 
of which people’s preferences are comparative evaluations.99 In 
enquiring about people’s preferences, researchers are asking 
people’s opinions of matters of fact, when “they should instead 
be trying to find out what the facts are” and evaluating those 
facts directly.100 After all, if people in general can form compar-
ative evaluations of the options available regarding IRRs, poli-
cy makers can do so as well.101 But if the options are more com-
plex than preferring chocolate to vanilla,102 even the majority 
that prefers one option will likely prefer it for a variety of dif-
ferent reasons, influenced by a variety of different beliefs.103 
Therefore, the majority’s preference is frequently not a good 
guide to what is good about the preferred option.104 
To develop policies regarding return of IRBRs, policy mak-
                                                          
 95. Id. at 262. 
 96. Id. at 263. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 262 (“[L]et informed preferences rather than manifest pref-
erences be the standard by which health states are compared. To measure in-
formed preferences, provide survey respondents with information . . . . Give 
them time to reflect.”). 
 99. See Hausman, supra note 59, at 23 (“But beneath the criticism lies a 
constructive thesis: that preferences in economics are subjective total evalua-
tions that are both action-guiding and subject to rational criticism.”). 
 100. Hausman, supra note 56, at 265. 
 101. See generally id. at 262–63 (noting that sophistication barriers can be 
removed by providing more information and using better questioning). 
 102. See supra Part 3.A. 
 103. Hausman, supra note 59, at 20. 
 104. See id. (“Choice could not by itself reveal preference, because, given 
the right set of beliefs, any set of choices is consistent with any set of prefer-
ences.”). 
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ers—investigators, institutional review boards, or biorepository 
governing bodies—should evaluate different options, different 
possible states of affairs: for example, the option of offering in-
dividualized findings that meet criteria of validity and signifi-
cance or offering no IRBRs that lack immediate life-saving po-
tential. They should examine how well different options 
regarding return of IRBRs achieve the reasons for returning 
IRBRs—namely, whether (and to what degree) the different op-
tions regarding IRBRs further or impede important goals in re-
search and health promotion. 
C. MIGHT SATISFYING PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES NEVERTHELESS 
BE A GOOD THING TO DO, OR AT LEAST A BENIGN APPROACH TO 
MANAGING IRBRS? 
Even if people’s preferences do not themselves constitute a 
reason to offer IRBRs, might offering return of such results still 
be a good thing—a nice thing to do? If offering IRBRs were 
largely costless or did not have any substantial downsides, it 
would seem that providing people with what they say they 
want might be a prima facie good (though whether doing so ac-
tually enhances well-being is a different issue). But, developing 
the infrastructure to offer back results of biorepository research 
(and indeed other research) is not costless. It is not even cheap. 
Few studies have attempted to establish the cost of return-
ing a genomic research result. In one, $1,322 was the average 
cost per completed disclosure.105 Of course, the details of a pro-
tocol to return results would significantly affect cost, especially 
with regard to personally tailoring or standardizing informa-
tional materials, the degree of personal contact and counseling 
provided, and the expense of confirming genotypes. Several 
commentators have indicated that additional funding will need 
to be built into research budgets—ranging from individual pro-
ject budgets to those of funding agencies, foundations, and 
commercial entities—if the costs of result-return activities are 
not to encroach on funds for research activities themselves.106 
However, none has suggested sources of such additional fund-
                                                          
 105. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 527. A few other studies also re-
port on the costs of offering back various types of individualized results. 
Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 716–17. 
 106. Lisa S. Parker, Rethinking Respect for Persons Enrolled in Research, 
AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN. EXCHANGE, Spring 2006, at 1; see also 
Fernandez, supra note 69, at 47–48 (acknowledging that returning research 
results will come with “financial and perhaps opportunity cost[s]”). 
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ing at a time of rising costs in research and health care and 
constraints on overall state and national budgets. In addition, 
some commentators are beginning to raise the issue of down-
stream costs occasioned by return of IRBRs, particularly the 
cascade of interventions such information may occasion.107 An-
ticipation of these costs prompts suggestions that the practice 
of returning research results should be subjected to compara-
tive effectiveness analysis.108 
Moreover, as a 2009 commentary advised, “if it is to be any 
benefit to health, genetic risk information needs to prompt in-
dividuals to pursue risk-reduction behaviors, yet early evidence 
suggests that genetic risk may not be an effective motivator of 
behavior change.”109 Variants discovered in gene-disease asso-
ciation studies have very small effect sizes, indicating that 
common diseases are complex (i.e., involve the interaction of 
multiple genes and the environment).110 Therefore, genomic 
risk information may best serve as “an adjunct to current risk 
assessment, refining rather than replacing other methods of 
risk stratification.”111 Moreover, it is “unclear whether most 
behavioral interventions can or should be individualized for 
people at moderately increased risk of disease.”112 “Aggressive 
prevention measures, such as prophylactic surgery, would be 
ethically and socially unacceptable for people with moderately 
increased risk,” while many less aggressive measures may be 
pursued as general healthy behaviors (e.g., diet, exercise, and 
smoking cessation), and their adoption may “have more to do 
with social circumstances than with genetic risk . . . .”113 The 
                                                          
 107. E.g., Clayton, supra note 9, at 261; Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. 
McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research, 
GENETICS MED. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3), available at 
http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/gim201210a.html; Amy 
L. McGuire et al., Research Ethics and the Challenge of Whole-Genome Se-
quencing, 9 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 152, 153 (2008). 
 108. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 9, at 261; Clayton & McGuire, supra note 
107, at 1; Nora B. Henrikson, Deborah Bowen & Wylie Burke, Does Genomic 
Risk Information Motivate People to Change Their Behavior?, 1 GENOME MED. 
37.1, 37.2 (2009). 
 109. Henrikson, Bowen & Burke, supra note 108, at 37.1. 
 110. Id. at 37.1–37.2. 
 111. Id. at 37.2. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. Indeed, even for individuals who are highly motivated to pursue 
such prevention behaviors (i.e., who have strong preferences for doing so), so-
cial circumstances may compete with their preference to influence their actual 
002 PARKER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:06 PM 
2012] RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS 469 
commentators acknowledge that while receipt of risk infor-
mation has been associated with little distress, of greatest con-
cern “is the fact that we lack evidence that individualized risk 
information is an effective motivator of behavioral change.”114 
They advocate holding provision of genomic risk information to 
a test of comparative effectiveness and state that “[h]ealth care 
providers and funders have a responsibility to use tests with 
proven health value—a standard not yet achieved for genetic 
risk information intended to motivate healthy behaviors.”115 
In comparison to studies of people’s preferences regarding 
return of individualized genomic results, there has been little 
research showing how receipt of DNA-related IRRs affects re-
cipients’ health behaviors. In light of this paucity, studies of 
what people do with genomic information of the sort that could 
be reported back as IRBRs may be relevant. Unfortunately, the 
sort of information that would constitute IRBRs has not had a 
good track record of motivating health behaviors. 
One study did report behavioral responses to return of ge-
nomic research results to melanoma survivors (a genomic IRR): 
“[f]ew health behavior changes were reported at the 3-month 
follow-up,” though most participants were already engaging in 
prevention behaviors.116 In eleven studies that assessed the 
impact of reporting a DNA-based increased risk for breast, 
ovarian, or colorectal cancer or for hypercholesterolemia, an in-
crease in risk-reducing behaviors (e.g., increased screening, 
prophylactic surgery) was reported in five of them.117 In a me-
ta-analysis of twenty-one studies examining the impact of ge-
netic counseling on those with familial cancer risk (though ad-
mittedly not DNA-based risk information), none of the four 
studies that examined behavioral impact found an increase in 
surveillance behavior.118 
Explanatory models accounting for these disappointing be-
havioral outcomes are being devised and tested, including, for 
                                                          
choice and behavior. This consideration thus fits with the model of preferences 
discussed above. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 526. 
 117. Theresa M. Marteau & John Weinman, Self-Regulation and the Be-
havioural Response to DNA Risk Information: A Theoretical Analysis and 
Framework for Future Research, 62 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1360, 1361 (2006). 
 118. Id.; see Dejana Braithwaite et al., Psychological Impact of Genetic 
Counseling for Familial Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 96 J. 
NAT’L CANCER INST. 122, 129 (2004). 
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example, the hypothesis that “the provision of DNA based risk 
information may fail to activate behavio[]ral responses (e.g. ad-
herence to treatment or dietary advice) that reduce a health 
threat either because a genetically based disease is perceived to 
be uncontrollable or amenable only to a biological treatment, or 
both.”119 This explanation moves beyond simple invocation of 
fatalism to suggest that perceptions of available interventions 
are also critical, as is the significance of risk reduction as a per-
sonally embraced goal. 
Individuals’ own explanatory models, information-
seeking/avoidance styles, and expectations are relevant to psy-
chological impact of DNA-based results as well. In the first 
randomized study directly comparing the impact of Alzheimer’s 
disease risk assessment, with and without the provision of gen-
otype information, an unfavorable genetic test result had rela-
tively little impact on risk perception.120 Investigators ex-
plained this by hypothesizing that the majority of those tested 
may have expected the unfavorable result based on family his-
tory: “[t]est results that meet expectations regardless of wheth-
er they are favorable or unfavorable have a less negative im-
pact than test results that confound expectations.”121 There are 
more studies that examine the psychological impact of receiv-
ing individualized genomic information than there are that ex-
amine the impact on behavior. A simplified but accurate sum-
mary of psychological impact studies to date may be: 
unfavorable results tend to cause less distress, and favorable 
results occasion less false reassurance than commentators have 
feared. It must be remembered that, because of the testing con-
texts generating results to date, most genomic results returned 
thus far were specifically sought, or at least the recipients ex-
pected their return. Among the contexts that matter for the ef-
fective return of genomic results is the context created by the 
recipient’s expectations.122 
  
                                                          
 119. Marteau & Weinman, supra note 117, at 1364. 
 120. Theresa M. Marteau et al., Predictive Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s 
Disease: Impact upon Risk Perception, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 397, 400 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 402. 
 122. For a discussion of how context may affect the researcher’s obligation 
to report IRBRs, see Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke, Commentary, Offering 
Individual Genetic Research Results: Context Matters, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL 
MED., June 30, 2010, at 1. 
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D. MIGHT ACCEDING TO PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES WITH REGARD 
TO IRBRS BE PRUDENT FOR THE SAKE OF THE RESEARCH 
ENTERPRISE ITSELF? 
Strong preferences about policies can affect their practica-
bility. If, for example, people so dislike a policy regarding the 
return of IRBRs that no one followed it, or if their dislike 
prompted actions with negative social consequences, then prac-
ticality would require that the policy be changed. Assume for 
the moment that a policy was developed that sought to curtail 
any return of IRBRs, and no one preferred the policy; indeed, 
everyone strongly disliked it. (Ignore issues of how it could even 
come to be.) If investigators and those regulating research at 
all levels strongly disliked the policy and thus refused to ad-
here to or enforce it, the policy would be ineffective. More like-
ly, given the preferences reported, prospective contributors 
would refuse to donate samples to biobanks. The policy would 
undermine or render impossible biorepository research. Even if 
the percentage of prospective contributors who refused to par-
ticipate was less than 100%, a somewhat more realistic as-
sumption, the number would likely be so high that 
biorepository research would be substantially slowed (because 
of substantially slower recruitment), or there would be in-
creased risk of research bias (particularly if participation re-
fusal were not consistent across all relevant populations). To be 
enforceable and socially beneficial, policies must serve the 
needs and interests of people, and must be seen to do so—or at 
least cannot be viewed as doing the opposite. Policies need “buy 
in.” 
It is true that when specifically asked about the im-
portance of the possibility of receiving IRBRs, a large propor-
tion of people surveyed and interviewed indicate that this pos-
sibility serves as an incentive to their consent to participate 
and/or that not being able to receive IRBRs would make them 
less inclined to do so.123 Thus it may be thought that the goals 
of biorepository research cannot be accomplished without satis-
fying the IRBR-related preferences of prospective biorepository 
contributors. Indeed, commentators imply that acceding to peo-
ple’s stated preference for return is warranted for the sake of 
the research enterprise itself,124 even though incentives to en-
                                                          
 123. Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 41. 
 124. Ann H. Partridge & Eric P. Winer, Informing Clinical Trial Partici-
pants About Study Results, 288 JAMA 363, 363–64 (2002) (suggesting that 
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courage participation in research that participants would oth-
erwise not consent to are frequently discouraged, if not prohib-
ited as undue inducements.125 
Findings from four studies illustrate the nature and 
strength of the IRBR-related preferences, as well as normative 
conclusions being drawn from them. In the first study, re-
searchers conducted an on-line survey to gage public willing-
ness to participate in a large -cohort study. The most influen-
tial factor affecting the respondent’s willingness to participate 
in the study seemed to be the offer of individualized results (as-
sociated with a six percent increase in the willingness to partic-
ipate), as opposed to an offer of monetary compensation (an of-
fer of $200 resulted in only a five percent increase in the 
willingness to participate).126 
In a second study, a genetic epidemiology study involving 
melanoma survivors, of participants who were re-contacted and 
offered their genetic IRRs, fifty-nine percent reported that dis-
closure increased the likelihood of their future participation in 
research.127 
In a third study, prospective biorepository contributors 
were presented with the informed consent template that had 
been developed for the biorepository.128 The template specified: 
“You should not expect to get individual results from research 
done with your blood.”129 When asked whether this statement 
affected their willingness to participate, ten percent said 
‘yes’.130 Over seventy-five percent of those interviewed thought 
investigators should return at least some IRRs, while almost 
seventy-five percent stated they understood they would not re-
ceive them based on the consent template; and, approximately 
ninety percent said this fact would not affect their opinion 
about participating.131 
                                                          
sharing results might motivate individuals to participate in clinical trials and 
bolster accruals). 
 125. E.g., General requirements for informed consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 
(2010) (“An investigator shall seek such consent only under circumstances . . . 
that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.”). 
 126. See Kaufman, supra note 13, at 832. 
 127. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 526. 
 128. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99. 
 129. Id. at 100. 
 130. Id. at 104–05. 
 131. Id. at 108. 
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In a fourth study, investigators reported and reflected on 
their focus group results: 
[A]ccess to individual research results was viewed as a valuable in-
centive for participating in the proposed study. Because large cohort 
gene-environment studies require long-term commitments from study 
volunteers with few incentives in the way of direct medical benefits, 
offering participants access to their personal research results may be 
useful in recruiting and retaining research participants.132 
They seem simultaneously to recognize the unlikelihood of 
individual benefit from the return of results and to advocate 
encouraging prospective repository participants to view results 
as benefits for the sake of study recruitment and retention. 
As if in direct response to such studies’ findings that the 
possibility of learning IRBRs serves as an incentive to enroll-
ment, other commentators note that “[t]o hold out access to un-
defined research results as a benefit would be a ‘dangerous 
move toward encouraging the therapeutic misconception if the 
results are preliminary and not validated, or their predictive 
value is not well understood’.”133 Moreover, offering partici-
pants information lacking health-related value when they mis-
takenly believe it to be valuable should be discouraged on 
grounds that is disingenuous to do so. This is especially true in 
light of findings from the investigators’ focus groups that the 
possibility of direct medical or at least health-related benefit is 
frequently cited as a primary reason that people prefer to re-
ceive results134 and that the most preferred option would be re-
turn of results that are accurate and actionable.135 
Although people report a preference for receiving IRRs (in-
cluding genomic IRRs) and indicate that the possibility of re-
ceiving them increases their willingness to participate in re-
search, when there has been no plan or promise to return 
results, there is no evidence of actual widespread research par-
ticipation refusal, and especially no evidence of any systematic 
trends in refusals, that would raise concern about introducing 
bias into biorepository research.136 Both whether and how not 
                                                          
 132. Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 41. 
 133. Knoppers & Laberge, supra note 27, at 108 (quoting Mildred K. Cho, 
Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics, 
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 284–85 (2008)). 
 134. E.g., Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 39–40. 
 135. See, e.g., id., at 39. 
 136. The concern about such bias is similar to the concern expressed that 
relying on “information altruists,” those “who are most willing to have their 
health data publicly shared,” could create subject bias and impede the ability 
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receiving IRBRs would affect recruitment for biorepository re-
search are empirical questions that warrant further study. In 
light of problems with people’s preferences identified herein, as 
well as evidence—admittedly from other contexts—that prefer-
ences do not predict behavior, it would be a mistake to accede 
to people’s manifest preferences for return for the sake of re-
cruitment to biorepository research, especially without evidence 
that doing so is necessary. 
E. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH BASING POLICIES ABOUT 
OFFERING IRBRS ON PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES 
In addition to the possibility that people’s preferences may 
be influenced by false beliefs, and the fact that asking about 
people’s preferences is a poor way to evaluate the relationship 
of those options to the goals of research, public health, and 
health care, there are additional problems with trying to use 
people’s preferences to inform research policy. 
First, the idea of “people’s preferences” is incoherent. Indi-
viduals have preferences, but “the people” do not. We can de-
termine what the majority of a specific population prefers, but 
unless that majority is instead unanimity, we cannot infer an 
individual’s preference from the majority’s preference.137 Ex-
cept perhaps for a few rare cases, there is no uniform prefer-
ence, unified view, or social consensus about the value or desir-
ability of being offered IRBRs.138 
                                                          
of genomic research to identify genetic variation relevant to the general popu-
lation. Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Policy Forum, No Longer De-
Identified, 312 SCI. 370, 371 (2006). 
 137. Even in a case of unanimity, if the states of affairs over which com-
parative evaluations are being made are themselves at all complex, individu-
als are likely to prefer the same option for different reasons based on different 
beliefs. So again, analyzing even a unanimous preference may not reveal much 
about the value of the option itself, and the unanimity of preference may be 
quite unstable. 
 138. The strongest candidate for attracting such social consensus is, I ar-
gue, information meeting the criteria for a duty to warn articulated in 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, where such a duty was found to 
hold for the individual having privileged access to credible information regard-
ing risk of a serious, preventable harm to another. See Parker, supra note 106, 
at 6 (comparing the duty to warn established in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of 
Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976), with the duty of a researcher in possession of 
life-saving information). Indeed, in this case it is the likelihood of being able to 
prevent a serious harm (murder) that justifies warning the potential victim, 
not data showing that most people would prefer to be warned. 
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In practice, we are stuck with the problem of moving from 
knowing data about “people’s IBRR preferences,” or the majori-
ty of people’s preferences, to learning about a specific individu-
al’s personal preference. Facts about the majority’s preferences 
do not straightforwardly reveal the preference of the particular 
person who is the subject of a specific IRBR. 
Ironically, those who draw the strongest connection be-
tween subjects’ preferences and researchers’ duties—by claim-
ing that the former entail the latter—render empirical data 
about preferences of minimal use. Whatever else it requires, re-
spect for persons demands that we attend to the unique prefer-
ences of each individual. Regardless of whether empirical data 
show that most subjects want results or not, as long as we 
know that even one may, researchers would be obligated to of-
fer results to all in search of that one.139 
This comment both points to the incoherence and suggests 
a possible way out. The suggestion is made that every individ-
ual be offered return of every IRBR, in order to ensure that 
those wanting IRBRs have access.140 But, this solution will not 
work, and it suggests the next set of problems. 
There is a second incoherence in the case of trying to re-
turn an IRBR according to the preferences of the individual to 
whom it is linked. There is no way for that individual to make 
an informed decision about whether she wants to receive the 
result unless she is substantially informed of the result. This 
problem arises at two decision stages: during informed consent 
to biobank participation and when an offer to receive an actual 
IRBR is made. An individual cannot be offered the options (to 
be offered/receive an IRBR or not) and make an adequately in-
formed comparative evaluation of her options without knowing 
important facts about the IRBRs that she might receive. But, 
informing her of those facts risks imposing on her information 
that she prefers not to receive. 
Choice of an option regarding IRBR return, even in the 
context of informed consent to biorepository participation, is 
choice in a hypothetical context. The informed consent context 
regarding IRBR management is similar to the hypothetical 
scenarios used in research on likely uptake of genetic suscepti-
bility testing.141 Indeed, the second decisional context—when 
                                                          
 139. Meyer, supra note 52, at 45. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Susan Persky et al., Assessing Hypothetical Scenario Methodology 
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one receives an offer of a specific (but as yet unre-
vealed/unreturned) IRBR and must make a decision—is also 
essentially a hypothetical situation. 
Research on people’s preferences regarding genetic suscep-
tibility testing frequently employs hypothetical scenarios, and 
there is often a substantial gap between anticipated (based on 
such research) and actual uptake of testing.142 Research on hy-
pothetical scenario methodology suggests that, for example, 
“higher intention-behavior congruence might be achieved via 
consideration of temporal proximity . . .” (i.e., “the extent to 
which a decision is portrayed as being immediate or having 
immediate consequences”).143 While such a change in research 
methodology might improve congruence between individuals’ 
actual behavior and the investigator-prompted expressions of 
their preference, it is not clear that this amendment could im-
prove the informed consent process regarding offers of 
IRBRs.144 It would be disingenuous to suggest to a biobank con-
tributor that the opportunity to receive an individual result is 
likely to be temporally proximate, or that if eventually found 
and reported, the result would have immediate consequences. 
                                                          
in Genetic Susceptibility Testing Analog Studies: A Quantitative Review, 9 
GENETICS MED. 727, 727 (2007) (“Because GST is generally not yet available 
for many common diseases, hypothetical scenario methodology has often been 
used to assess testing interest and estimate upcoming need for services. This 
methodology has the benefit of allowing investigators to manipulate important 
test characteristics and contextual variables to understand better how these 
factors influence reported interest levels and intentions to test.”). This frame-
work also applies to IRBR informed consent because in “the context of a 
biorepository . . . participants may be enrolled based simply on their member-
ship in a particular population . . . and not because they have a particular 
condition of interest.” Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99. “Specimens and 
data are stored for future, unspecified use in a variety of studies that typically 
take place without the subject’s direct knowledge or consent.” Id. Thus, when 
researchers are providing informed consent in contexts that may generate 
IRBRs, they often must use the equivalent of hypothetical scenarios what the 
research may reveal and the very tests the specimen will be used for are un-
known. 
 142. See Persky, supra note 141, at 727 (“Hypothetical scenario methodolo-
gy is commonly employed in the study of genetic susceptibility testing uptake 
estimation. The methodology, however, has not been rigorously assessed and 
sizeable gaps exist between estimated and actual uptake for tests that have 
recently become available.”). 
 143. Id. at 728. 
 144. See generally id. (discussing only generally how hypothetical scenario 
methodology could be improved without discussing any implication these im-
provements could have for the informed consent process). 
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Nearly two decades ago, the proposal of generic consent for 
genetic screening anticipated this problem of needing to make a 
decision about whether to receive genomic information in a con-
text of substantial uncertainty about the nature of the infor-
mation and implications of receiving it.145 Unfortunately, ge-
neric consent does not provide a good solution.146 Selection of 
the results or the type of results one would want to receive from 
research with biorepositories is daunting and probably not a 
good bargain to make with the future. Pleiotropy makes it im-
possible, for example, to elect to learn about risks for cardiovas-
cular conditions, but to refuse risk information regarding fu-
ture cognitive impairment, because already the pleiotropy of 
the APOε4 allele is known. But many similar associations of a 
specific genetic variation with multiple conditions remain to be 
discovered and reported, or not. How can one meaningfully 
choose? How should one factor into the decision that additional 
associated conditions may be discovered in the future? Of 
course, in clinical care informed consent decisions are at best 
substantially informed and never fully so. Yet, most clinical in-
terventions are more immediate and time limited.147 Consent to 
clinical interventions is less of a blank check. Most importantly, 
the potential benefits of a clinical intervention are often well-
characterized, even if they do not all eventuate. Admittedly, the 
risks of actual clinical interventions are frequently greater 
than those of merely receiving genomic information.148 If, how-
                                                          
 145. E.g., Sherman Elias & George J. Annas, Generic Consent for Genetic 
Screening, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1611, 1611 (1994). 
 146. E.g., Leslie G. Biesecker & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Letter to the Editor, 
331 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1024 (1994) (“A generic-consent model would draw pa-
tients into the prenatal testing process with an incomplete understanding of 
what is involved. This policy would have the undesirable effect of diminishing 
the opportunity to decline testing, which may be the best option for some pa-
tients.”). 
 147. See also Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 101 (“Approximately 
30% of interviewees made comments about research relative to medical care. . 
. . Almost all described differences between the two, noting for example that 
research was ‘not like a regular doctor visit’ where one would expect diagnosis, 
treatment, and followup. Some specifically noted a difference between a biolog-
ical sample that could ‘sit on a shelf with a million others’ and individual med-
ical care, although a few felt that a personal connection remained between a 
biospecimen and the individual from whom it came.”) (internal reference omit-
ted) (emphasis omitted). 
 148. See, e.g., Henrikson, Bowen & Burke, supra note 108, at 37.2 (“It is 
also unclear whether most behavioral interventions can or should be individu-
alized for people at moderately increased risk of disease. Aggressive preven-
tion measures, such as prophylactic surgery, would be ethically and socially 
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ever, one considers that undertaking health behaviors or clini-
cal interventions in light of the genomic information is part of a 
package deal of receiving genomic information, then the ratio of 
risks and potential benefits shifts once again. 
A third problem with trying to use an individual’s prefer-
ences to manage any IRBRs discovered about her is that an in-
dividual’s preferences are frequently inconsistent and change 
over time.149 Moreover, the circumstances that influenced or 
competed with those earlier preferences change over time, as do 
the beliefs that influenced them.150 The person who expressed a 
preference for learning an IRBR because she would want to in-
form her offspring of any significant health risk may find her-
self without children. A person who wanted to learn his/her 
health-related IRBRs to motivate preventive health behaviors 
may still highly value health and prevention, but be preoccu-
pied with a health concern unrelated to the IRBR. It may be 
said that these are simply reasons for embracing a policy that 
establishes a two-step process: first asking (during informed 
consent ) whether one would want to be offered an IRBR upon 
its discovery, and then later asking whether one, in fact, wants 
to receive the IRBR that is discovered. But this two-step pro-
cess does not address the problem of an individual’s lacking ad-
equate information to make an informed decision about wheth-
er she wants to know what she does not yet know.151 
                                                          
unacceptable for people with moderately increased risk, whereas many behav-
iors, such as smoking cessation and regular exercise, reduce risk for many dis-
eases at all levels of risk.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 59, at 9 (“As comparative evaluations, 
preferences are subject to criticism and discussion. Even preferences that 
seem like mere comparative likings can be criticized and rationally reconsid-
ered. For example, even though Jack likes cheesecake a great deal more than 
he likes sorbet, his preferences among those desserts may change radically 
after a mild stroke coupled with a stern warning from his doctor about his cho-
lesterol level.”). 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“The most fundamental difficulty with actual re-
vealed-preference theory (which also bears on hypothetical revealed-
preference theory) is that an agent’s preferences influence her choices only via 
the agent’s beliefs. Keep her preferences constant and change her beliefs, and 
her choices may change. There is no one-to-one relation between preference 
and choice. Preferences can be inferred from choices only given knowledge of 
beliefs.”). 
 151. See McGuire & Gibbs, supra note 136, at 371 (“Some of the practical 
challenges [with stratified consent procedures] include providing adequate 
disclosure and education about a complex risk calculus, ensuring subject com-
prehension, coordinating a system of restricted access, and managing a com-
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F. SHOULD PREFERENCES PLAY ANY ROLE IN OFFERING AND 
RETURNING IRBRS? 
In short, yes. Abiding by the enrollee’s manifest prefer-
ence—the choice made during the informed consent process for 
biobank participation—is ethically appropriate, but not as a 
matter of fact about preferences with the goal of their satisfac-
tion. It is ethically appropriate as a matter of respecting the 
right of a competent person to make a research or health-
related decision to refuse or accept options being offered. Re-
specting an enrollee’s choice is warranted by the norms govern-
ing research, informed consent, and health-related decision 
making, not by alleged facts about people’s preferences or the 
effect of preference satisfaction on research enrollment.152 
If an individual has been asked, as part of the informed 
consent process, and has responded that she wants to be offered 
IRBRs, her choice should be respected. Whatever her prefer-
ence (qua comparative evaluation) with respect to receiving the 
results may be, she has made it known that she wishes to be 
offered the opportunity to make such a choice. In like manner, 
if upon being offered a specific IRBR, an individual chooses to 
receive it, again that choice should be honored. Why should in-
vestigators honor it? First, although the consent context suffers 
from the problems plaguing choice in hypothetical contexts, at 
least the notion of preference is coherent: an individual can 
form and express her own preference qua comparative evalua-
tion. Second, the informed consent decisions of putatively com-
petent individuals are to be respected, as are their other deci-
sions made in response to provisions of an ethically approved 
research protocol. Third, the individual’s preference qua choice 
should be respected, in short, because she was asked. The in-
vestigator or biorepository created the context in which the con-
tributor was asked to make a comparative evaluation and to 
express a decision. The investigator or biorepository created 
expectations on the part of the participant that it would be dis-
respectful not to endeavor to fulfill. If outside of the context of 
informed consent, the participant were asked—by the investi-
gator, not just in casual conversation with her friends—her 
preference about being offered IRBRs, this reason for respect-
ing her preference might still apply. The creation of justified 
                                                          
plex database that accounts for subjects’ informed disclosure preferences.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 
1990). 
002 PARKER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:06 PM 
480 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
expectations through the interaction, not her having and ex-
pressing the preference, is ethically critical. 
IV. THREE NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS INFORMED BY 
THE FACTS 
In the preceding pages, this inquiry has provided reasons 
to be at least skeptical and cautious about turning to people’s 
preferences regarding return of IRBRs to motivate, justify, or 
inform policies to manage IRBRs. In this final section I want to 
turn from alleged facts about people’s preferences to some nor-
mative considerations about returning results. The literature in 
this regard is large and growing, as is this paper.153 For those 
reasons, I limit myself to three points. 
First, let us begin with interests and well-being, as re-
search regulations concerning human subjects are designed to 
protect participants’ well-being, though not to promote individ-
ual interests.154 Instead, research promotes social interests, ad-
equately constrained by protecting individuals’ welfare and re-
specting persons.155 I believe one reason that the assessment 
and incorporation of people’s preferences into policies regarding 
IRBRs has seemed so attractive is that we tend to believe that 
people’s preferences guide us toward what people value, which 
in turn provides guidance toward at least their own conceptions 
of their well-being. If only we could rely on peoples’ preferences, 
we would not need to inquire directly, and perhaps paternalis-
tically, into their interests. But, paternalistic understanding of 
individuals’ well-being can be justified in the context of re-
search, even genomic research.156 
                                                          
 153. Within this literature I find myself in greatest sympathy with the 
normative arguments of Laura Beskow, Ellen Wright Clayton, and Pilar 
Ossorio. See, e.g., Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 108–09; Clayton & 
McGuire, supra note 107, at 1–2; Pilar N. Ossorio, Letting the Gene out of the 
Bottle: A Comment on Returning Individual Research Results to Participants, 
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 24, 24–25. On empirical points relevant 
to these normative arguments, I am persuaded by considerations raised by 
Fiona Miller and her co-authors. See, e.g., F. A. Miller et al., Duty to Disclose 
What? Querying the Putative Obligation to Return Research Results to Partici-
pants, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 210, 210–11 (2008). 
 154. E.g., Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Facing Up to Paternal-
ism in Research Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2007, at 24, 24 
(“The reigning regulatory and ethical frameworks for human research empha-
size the protection of research subjects.”). 
 155. See id. at 28–30. 
 156. Id. 
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Perhaps even more important in this case, research is a 
context in which we can justify promoting social interests (e.g., 
by demanding the comparative effectiveness of health-related— 
and frequently, publicly funded—interventions and reserving 
research funds for the pursuit of research) even when this in-
volves limiting individuals’ access to what they want.157 Such 
limitation seems especially justified when what people want is 
not clearly in their interests, or is occasioned by an apparent 
psychological disposition that leads people to want their per-
sonal genomic information largely because someone else knows 
it.158 Social interest in the progress of research may justify not 
supplying individual benefit (e.g., information that would actu-
ally contribute to an individual’s well-being).159 It may justify 
granting less weight to individuals’ interests in control per se 
than in their interest in protecting their person or various ma-
terial interests they have.160 Eventually, if all goes well, the in-
formation that is now the content of genomic research results, 
aggregate and individual, will inform individuals’ clinical care. 
The topic of returning IRBRs of biorepository research will be-
come an issue of the past, because the reliable and significant 
results will not only inform clinical care, but also individuals’ 
access to that personal information will be part of a health care 
infrastructure grounded in science and guided by results of 
comparative effectiveness research. 
Second, two related reasons frequently offered in support 
of offering IRBRs back to biorepository contributors are respect 
for persons and reciprocity.161 Respect for persons demands not 
treating contributors to research solely as means to an end.162 
                                                          
 157. Id. at 29 (“Because prospective subjects are rarely in a position to as-
sess either the social or scientific value of a research protocol or the validity of 
its research methods, IRBs are given that charge in their stead.”). 
 158. See id. at 24. 
 159. Failure to benefit research participants is not the same as harming 
them. If failure to benefit were to become a prevalent understanding of 
“harm,” then IRBs’ assessment of probable harm-to-benefit ratios and the ap-
propriateness of various research designs would need to be revised in myriad 
contexts. 
 160. Id. at 33 (“There is a tendency to see informed consent as being moti-
vated solely by the value of the agent’s autonomy, as contrasted with the 
agent’s welfare or interests. This is a mistake. After all, people want to be in 
control of their lives not just to protect some abstract value of noninterference 
or to keep themselves from being treated merely as a means, but also to pro-
tect their interests from those who would harm them.”). 
 161. F. A. Miller et al., supra note 153, at 210. 
 162. Id. 
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The duty to respect participants as persons requires respecting 
their informed refusal of participation and honoring their other 
choices during informed consent (and throughout the research). 
It involves treating them with respect, not satisfying their pref-
erences. Failure to offer individualized results does not treat 
subjects solely as a means to the scientific end of obtaining 
generalizable data. Further, treating participants with respect 
may involve recognizing their contributions (where doing so 
would not violate confidentiality or impose group harms) and 
providing them with aggregate study results in terms they can 
understand; it certainly involves interacting with them respect-
fully.163 
Giving participants the IRRs they want is advocated as a 
matter of reciprocity.164 The results are regarded as a “thank 
you” gift or compensation for study participation, or a reward 
for altruism.165 I disagree with this approach. If study partici-
pants and biorepository contributors are to be compensated, 
that compensation should be given to all of them. Being com-
pensated or thanked for participation should not depend on 
one’s particular genome (giving rise to an IRR/IRBR). If offer-
ing a benefit is necessary to compensate, evidence respect, or 
avoid exploiting subjects, then the benefit should not be of un-
certain scientific or personal value; it should not depend on the 
individuals’ social circumstances and personal ability to trans-
late it into something of value (e.g., clinical interventions or 
positive behavioral change). Out of fairness, the benefit should 
be of established and of relatively uniform value to all subjects 
(e.g., money in exchange for inconvenience or a gift certificate 
for something everyone uses). 
A final point about fairness is the third normative consid-
eration I want to raise. Fairness dictates that individual benefit 
from research participation should not depend on one’s genome 
or other individual characteristics, but should be given to all 
who contribute. Obviously, the possibility of receiving an IRBR 
depends partly on one’s own genome. It also depends partly on 
the research questions and procedures pursued, as well as on 
the other people and genomes accrued into in the biorepository 
or genomic study, because discovery of patterns of genetic vari-
                                                          
 163. Ossorio, supra note 153, at 24. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
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ation is critical to discovering genotype-phenotype associa-
tions.166 Currently, a substantial amount of pharmacogenomic 
research, for example, relies upon the fact that genetic varia-
tions associated with different drug responses occur in varying 
frequencies in different continental ancestry groups.167 Sub-
stantially unequal representation from different continental 
ancestry groups, inadequate representation from some groups, 
or the failure to ask research questions relevant to particular 
groups or individuals with particular patterns of genetic varia-
tion can all limit the likelihood of identifying a reliable finding 
relevant to particular continental ancestry groups. Genetic var-
iations common to particular ancestry groups must be suffi-
ciently well-characterized to ground accurate and clinically 
meaningful interpretation. Such characterization must be un-
dertaken through initiation of studies. However, to cite a prom-
inent pharmacogenomic example, to date, fewer studies of drug 
response associated with the CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 genes, 
which are associated with the metabolism of at least fifty 
drugs, have been undertaken in African Americans and His-
panics than in Whites and Asians.168 The potential for such 
disparities in the likelihood of research participation revealing 
an individual genomic result of some value suggests that return 
of IRBRs is not a suitable form of compensation or gratitude for 
research participation. 
CONCLUSION 
Factual information is obviously relevant to normative 
considerations of fairness, what is respectful, what is a suitable 
“than you” gift, and what contributes to individuals’ well-being. 
As a whole, this inquiry has sought to shift attention away 
from facts about preferences—especially the incoherent notion 
of “people’s preferences,” but also individual’s preferences. It 
                                                          
 166. See Cho, supra note 133, at 282. 
 167. Geography has influenced mating and migration patterns across cen-
turies, with the result that people who have a specific continental ancestry 
(e.g., Asian or African) exhibit frequencies of genetic variation that differ from 
those with a different continental ancestry. Members of different ancestry 
groups exhibit slightly more genetic difference from each other than from oth-
er members of the same continental ancestry population. E.g., Morris W. Fos-
ter & Richard R. Sharp, Beyond Race: Towards a Whole-Genome Perspective 
on Human Populations and Genetic Variations, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS 790, 
passim (2004). 
 168. N. Poolsup et al., Pharmacogenetics and Psychopharmacotherapy, 25 
J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 197, 201, 206 (2000). 
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has instead advocated direct examination of what can improve 
individuals’ health, which social circumstances impede adop-
tion of disease prevention behaviors, and which false beliefs 
and expectations need to be corrected to enable incorporation of 
genomic information into clinical care. It has suggested that 
facts regarding the comparative effectiveness of various inter-
ventions inform normative arguments regarding fairness, harm 
avoidance, and benefit in health and research policies. Facts 
have important roles to play in policies, though facts about 
people’s preferences do not. 
 
